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Joseph v. Angelone
184 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 1999)
L Facts
On October 26, 1992, Jason Matthew Joseph ("Joseph") and his co-
defendant Kiasi Powell ("Powell") entered a Subway store to conunit a
robbery. Joseph was armed with a .45-caliber pistol. Once inside the store,
Joseph ordered a sandwich from Jeffrey Anderson ("Anderson"), a Subway
employee. After Anderson finished making the sandwich, Joseph produced
the pistol and told Anderson to open the cash register and drop to the floor.
After Anderson complied with the demand, Joseph shot him. Evidence
introduced by the Commonwealth during the guilt phase of the trial in-
cluded Powell's testimony and a video from the store's security cameras.'
At sentencing, the jury recommended the death penalty after finding
the future dangerousness aggravating factor. The trial court accepted tfie
jury's recommendation and sentenced Joseph to death. Joseph's subsequent
appeals to the Supreme Court of Virginia and the United States Supreme
Court were denied. After his state habeas petition was denied, Joseph filed
a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia. The district court dismissed the petition. From that
order of dismissal, Joseph appealed.' On appeal, Joseph claimed he was
entitled to habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) his constitutional
ights were violated by the trial court's refusal to inform the jury that he
would not be eligible for parole for a number of years; (2) the district court
erred in refusing to grant him an evidentiary hearing to examine whether a
newspaper account of a comment allegedly made by Joseph influenced the
jury's sentencing decision; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because (a) his attorneys failed to present certain mitigating evidence at
sentencing, (b) the mental health expert evaluation provided to him was
inadequate, and (c) his counsel and the Commonwealth failed to produce
certain mental health records; and (4) application of section 19.2-264.3(1) of
the Virginia Code violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.'
1. Joseph v. Angelone, 184 F.3d 320, 323 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. Id. (citing Joseph v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 862 (Va. 1995); Joseph v. Virginia,
516 U.S. 876 (1995)).
3. Id. at 323-24. Joseph's claims regarding his eligibility for parole and the effect of
the newspaper report on the jury's sentencing decision will not be discussed in detail in this
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II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied
Joseph a certificate of appealability and dismissed his petition.4
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. Failure to Investigate and Present Mitigating Evidence
Joseph claimed that the assistance provided by his attorneys at sentenc-
ing was constitutionally ineffective because they failed to investigate and
present mitigating evidence which tended to prove that Joseph suffered from
brain damage.' The court applied the two-pronged test established by
Strickland v. Washington.' Because the court found that Joseph failed to
prove that his trial counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable, it
did not consider the prejudice prong.7
The crux of Joseph's claim was that his trial counsel should have
uncovered evidence tending to show that Joseph suffered from brain dam-
age. The court found counsel's performance on this issue to be objectively
article. The court's disposition of these claims does not offer any guidance for capital defense
lawyers in Virginia. These claims are briefly described below.
During sentencing, Joseph sought to inform the jury that, although he would be eligible
for parole, he would not be eligible for many years. Because then-applicable Virginia law
prevented a defendant from introducing evidence of parole eligibility, the trial court over-
ruled Joseph's motion to present such evidence. Subsequent to Joseph's sentencing, the
United States Supreme Court decided Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994)
(holding that where future dangerousness is an issue and state law prohibits parole for capital
life imprisonment sentences, due process demands that the defendant be allowed to inform
the jury of parole ineligibility). The Supreme Court of Vir g ia, relying on language from
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Simmons, affirmed Joseph's sentence and concluded that
Simmons was inapplicable when a defendant was eligible for parole. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed. Joseph, 184 F.3d at 324.
The day after the jury found Joseph guilty, a local newspaper printed a story reportmg
that Joseph had turned to the victim's widow and said "shit happens" after the verdict was
read. Id. at 325 n.3. Joseph claimed that the district court erred by refusing to grant an
evidentiary hearing to examine the effect of the newspaper article on the jury's sentencing
decision. Because Joseph did not raise this claim until the federal habeas proceeding, the
court determined that it was procedurally defaulted. Joseph argued that he could overcome
the default by showing cause and prejudice resulting from ineffective assistance of counsel in
his state habeas proceeding. In rejecting Joseph's claim, the court refused to revisit its
decision in Mackall v. A ngelone, 131 F.3d 442,449 (4th Cir. 1998), which held that a defendant
cannot use ineffective assistance of counsel to show cause because there is no right to counsel
during state habeas proceedings. Joseph, 184 F.3d at 324-25.
4. Id. at 330.
5. Id. at 325.
6. 466 U.S. 668,687-88 (1983) (holding counsel's representation to be constitutionally
ineffective if it was both objectively unreasonable and prejudicial to the defendant).
7. Joseph, 184 F.3d at 326.
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reasonable under Strickland.! The court's decision was based on the efforts
taken by Joseph's counsel to obtain a mental health expert to evaluate him.
Prior to trial, Joseph's attorneys obtained the services of Dr. Andrew
Billups.9 After conducting eight sessions with Joseph, interviewing Joseph's
mother, and reviewing Joseph's school and criminal records, Dr. Billups
concluded that Joseph did not suffer from any mental illness. 0 The court
determined that while Dr. Billups's testimony was not favorable to Joseph,
his attorneys' reliance on a psychologist who specialized in capital sentenc-
ing was reasonable.1
In light of the fact that the Commonwealth put on a mental health
expert of its own, it was important for Joseph's attorneys to obtain an
independent expert to evaluate Joseph. It is impossible, however, for an
attorney to guarantee that an expert will reach conclusions that ultimately
favor his client. When expert testimony by a mental health expert does not
produce favorable mitigating evidence, capital defense counsel should not
foreclose the possibility that other avenues of investigation may produce
evidence that would mitigate the Commonwealth's future dangerousness
evidence. For example, research has indicated that jurors sometimes find
certain lay witnesses more credible and persuasive than expert witnesses. 2
Specifically, jurors tend to find lay experts who have personal knowledge of
the defendant's situation but do not have the bias that attaches to witnesses
having personal relationships with the defendant particularly persuasive.13
However, testimony by family and friends, although inherently biased in
favor of the defendant, can also be powerful because it provides the jury
with a personal picture of the defendant during the sentencing phase that
usually does not surface during the guilt phase. 4 Joseph's attorneys should
thus be commended for their efforts in presenting mitigating testimony by
both Joseph's mother and girlfriend."
2. Failure to Provide Constitutionally Effective Mental Health Experts
Joseph argued that his constitutional rights were violated because the
evaluation provided by Dr. Billups was not a competent mental health
8. Id. at 326-27.
9. Id. at 326.
10. Id. Joseph was also examined by Dr. Henry Gwaltney, the Commonwealth's
expert. Dr. Gwaltney also concluded that Joseph did not suffer from any mental illness. Id.
11. id.
12. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (1997).
13. Id. at 1118, 1145.
14. Id. at 1151-52, 1161.
15. Joseph, 184 F.3d at 323.
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examination. 16 In support of his argument, Joseph relied on Ake v. Oklaho-
Ia.17 In Ake, the United States Supreme Court held that when sanity will
be an issue at trial, "the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant
access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examina-
tion and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.""
Relying on its decision in Wilson v. Greene,' the Fourth Circuit reasoned
that Ake was more concerned with providing access to mental health experts
than with the ultimate performance of the expert.20 It would appear, how-
ever, that an inadequate evaluation would render the expert assistance
provided by the Commonwealth meaningless. The court determined that
even if Ake entitled defendants to some minimum level of professional
evaluation, Dr. Billups met that standard by evaluating Joseph on eight
separate occasions."1 In response, counsel should argue that the number of
times an expert meets with a defendant is an inaccurate measure of the
adequacy of the professional evaluation provided to the defendant.
3. Failure to Request Mental Health Records under Brady v. Maryland22
In his final ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Joseph argued that
both his trial counsel and the Commonwealth were at fault for faiiing to
produce records from Central State Hospital.23 In hindsight, both Joseph's
trial counsel and Dr. Billups asserted that the Central State Hospital records
would have assisted them in their preparation of mitigating evidence.24 The
court determined that because Joseph failed to raise this claim in his state
habeas petition, it was procedurally defaulted. The court noted that mere
allusion to a claim was inadequate to protect it from procedural default.2"
To avoid procedural default, a claim must "be presented faceup and
squarely."2 To protect a claim from falling prey to the rules of procedural
default, capital defense counsel must insure that each claim they seek to
preserve for appeal or habeas is stated clearly, raised as early as possible, and
16. Id. at 327.
17. 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (holding that when sanity will be an issue at trial, due process
requires that the state provide indigent defendants with access to a competent psychiatric
expert).
18. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (emphasis added).
19. 155 F.3d 396, 401-02 (4th Cir. 1998).
20. Joseph, 184 F.3d at 327.
21. Id.
22. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
23. Joseph, 184 F.3d at 327.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 328.
26. Townes v. Murray, 68 F.3d 840, 846 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Mallory v. Smith, 27
F.3d 991, 995 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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federalized. This case also illustrates why it is important for counsel to
aggressively pursue all exculpatory material that they are entitled to receive
under Brady. Capital defense counsel are invited to contact the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse for assistance with Brady motions.
B. Application of Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.3(1)
Under section 19.2-264.3(1)(F)(1) of the Virginia Code, if the attorney
for the defendant gives notice that he plans to present testimony of a mental
health expert to support a claim in mitigation, the Commonwealth then has
the right to have an expert evaluate the defendant, and the defendant must
cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert."' Joseph argued that the
application of section 19.2-264.3(1) violated his constitutional rights because
the statutory requirement that he cooperate with the Commonwealth's
expert caused him to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation in exchange for an evaluation by his own mental health expert,
which was an integral component of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial and statutory right to present a defense.2" The court held that the
statute and its application to Joseph was constitutional. 9 Although the
court rejected Joseph's challenge to section 19.2-264.3(1), it is a valid claim
and defense counsel should continue to litigate this issue.3"
Under section 19.2-264.3(1)(G) of the Virginia Code, evidence derived
from statements made by a defendant to the Commonwealth's expert
cannot be introduced against the defendant during the sentencing phase for
the purpose of establishing an aggravating circumstance. 31 Dr. Gwaltney,
the Commonwealth's expert, testified that Joseph lacked "insight and
judgment" because he denied involvement in the crime.32 The court held
that the introduction of that statement was not error because it was elicited
by Joseph's own attorney on cross-examination."
Heather L. Necklaus
27. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3(1)(F) (Michie 1999). For a discussion of why defense
counsel should consider using court-appointed experts as a part of the defense team without
calling the expert to testify during trialor sentencing, see Jason J. Solomon, Case Note, 11
CAP. DEF. J. 185 (1998) (analyzing Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998)).
28. Joseph, 184 F.3d at 328.
29. Id. at 329.
30. For a discussion of other ways to attack the constitutionality of section 19.2-
264.3(1), see Jason J. Solomon, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 197 (1998) (analyzing Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 538 (Va. 1998)).
31. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3(1)(G) (Michie 1999).
32. Joseph, 184 F.3d at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. at 329-30.
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